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Such a principle pragmatism discovers in the fact that this othering is connected with our direct experience of the value of the sound or ache or whatever other content it be, and with our desire or purpose to retain and develop that value, or to get rid of it.

How, then, do ideas "work"? Ideas mark the initiation of new connections between things. Thinking makes an essential difference to, adds something to, the things thought of or about. Even a so-called past act, in becoming known, is altered in the sense that it takes on additional functions and consequences. Knowing *is* the beginning of new interactions and new consequences, it does not simply prepare the conditions for the beginning. Knowing is our desire, our will, our practical interests getting out of ambiguity and confusion into order and efficiency.

Thus the pragmatist agrees with the realist that the world is *not* my idea, but disagrees with him and shows his sympathy with the idealist in insisting that every phase of it may be mediated *through* ideas. But when the latter maintains that thought is absolute and constitutive of all experience, the pragmatist demurs, contending that it is always and only our finite, particular, specialized thought which is operative.

Such, in brief, is the argument of the course of lectures. To outline the content of the various papers which follow were superfluous, inasmuch as three of them are reprinted verbatim from this JOURNAL and the others are equally available in the journals above indicated.

This volume is not likely to silence all the objections to pragmatism nor to convert any one with whom the spirit is not already wrestling. Strenuous as is the attempt to present reflective thought as an instrument of control and mediation in a plastic, social world, still the problem of "responsibility to the objective" does not evaporate. About this old problem of the *objective* the entire pragmatic controversy turns. Convince one that the social situation is the absolute, and that objectivity is only a distinction arising within it and applicable to some of its contents—then that other pragmatic doctrine, the purposive nature and test of truth, follows easily enough. But has Professor Moore convinced us of his first and fundamental assumption?

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Totemism: An Analytical Study. A. A. GOLDENWEISER. Reprinted from *The Journal of American Folk-Lore*, April-June, 1910, Vol. XXIII., pp. 179-293.

Since 1887, when J. G. Frazer published his little monograph on totemism, no topic in the wide field of social anthropology has aroused greater speculation and controversy amongst English and continental scholars. American students, for the most part, have refrained from general discussions of the problem, contenting themselves with the humbler but possibly more useful task of amassing the data relating to totemism within our own aboriginal area. Mr. Goldenweiser's doctoral dissertation, which was written under the supervision of Professor Boas, of Columbia, subjects the numerous theories of totemism to rigid

analysis and criticism. It is a valuable piece of work, though one could wish that its publication might have been delayed long enough for the author to examine Frazer's four massive volumes on "Totemism and Exogamy" which appeared in the same year and represent his final views on this subject. As respects many points, however, the two writers are found in substantial, though unconscious, agreement.

Dr. Goldenweiser does not profess to set forth any body of new facts dealing with totemism. His work is an essay in scientific method designed to show that previous investigators have approached the problem without due consideration of the methodological procedure involved. For this purpose he institutes a detailed comparison of the Australian and British Columbia evidence with regard to the main features commonly considered symptomatic of totemism—in particular, an exogamous clan, a clan name derived from the totem, a religious or at least friendly attitude towards the totem, prohibitions or taboos against killing or eating the totem, a belief in descent from the totem. As far as the first two of these features are concerned, he discovers only a superficial resemblance which may have been the outcome of a quite different historical development in the two regions compared. Two other symptoms, namely, taboo and descent from the totem, he finds lacking in one of the areas, totemic taboos being unknown in British Columbia, and descent from the totem being absent from several, though not all, the Columbian tribes. This variability of the supposedly permanent factors of totemism leads him to the conclusion that they are rather independent ethnic units which may enter into different combinations with one another. He points out further that actual totemism as found in the two areas considered is not limited to the features or symptoms enumerated above, since in Australia magical rites and a belief in soul incarnation assume great importance in totemic matters, whilst in British Columbia there is a marked development of decorative art and the guardian spirit idea. From all this the author argues that "totemism" presents so many differing features as to lose all scientific value as a descriptive term applicable to world-wide phenomena. We may speak, with propriety, of the "totemic complex" in any given tribe or tribes; but totemism itself is only an abstract conception expressing a relation or mode of association.

Such is Dr. Goldenweiser's most important generalization. To a certain extent he has been anticipated by Professor Frazer, who, after an exhaustive *résumé* of the evidence, concludes that exogamy is not an integral part of totemism, and further that by no means all prohibitions relating to animals are to be reduced to totemic taboos. Totemism, to paraphrase Professor Frazer, is only one of the multitudinous forms around which savage superstitions have crystallized. On the other hand, the two writers are in marked disagreement as to the actual content of totemism, since Professor Frazer, after having surveyed in some sixteen hundred pages the geographical diffusion of totemic customs, is impressed with their general similarity. Though differences of detail occur, on the whole the resemblances are so many and so close as to deserve to be classed together under a common name. Hence he defines totemism, in the last

analysis, as "an intimate relation which is supposed to exist between a group of kindred people on the one side and a species of natural or artificial objects on the other side, which objects are called the totems of the human group."¹

We do not find that Dr. Goldenweiser, in his anxiety to prove that there is nothing of a specific character in totemic phenomena, gives proper weight to the evidence yielded by comparative studies in support of some such generalization as that which has been cited. His own definition, "Totemism is the tendency of definite social units to become associated with objects and symbols of emotional value" (p. 275), might be applied with equal validity to many other instances of the socialization of emotional values in primitive society. Thus the modern Todas have "socialized" their buffaloes and everything pertaining to the dairy; the nomadic Semites socialized the date-palm, the ancient Romans the cult of fire. It may be granted that from the psychological standpoint totemism refers to a process of socialization which doubtless works itself out somewhat differently in various communities and under varying situations. What has interested anthropological students, however, is the fact that over enormous regions of the savage world the outcome of this socializing process is a general similarity of the beliefs and customs commonly denominated totemic. Dr. Goldenweiser has been highly successful in pointing out what totemism is *not*—a task of no great difficulty; but there is such a thing as slurring over real and fundamental resemblances in order to emphasize minor points of dissimilarity and divergence.

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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

MIND. April, 1911. *The Psychological Explanation of the Development of the Perception of External Objects* (III.) (*Reply to Professor Stout*) (pp. 161-180): H. W. B. JOSEPH. — A rejoinder to an earlier reply from Professor Stout. Objections are reasserted to certain fundamental positions in Professor Stout's psychology, maintaining that the removal of certain admitted confusions requires "a revision of his principles." *The Humanism of Protagoras* (pp. 181-196): F. C. S. SCHILLER. — Further discussion touching the question as to "how far the absolutism of Plato can be regarded as a successful reply to the relativism of the fifth century B.C." *The Ground of Appearances* (pp. 196-211): E. D. FAWCETT. — "The main contention is that Nature and conscious individuals are evolved in time out of what can be best likened—not to a Cosmic Reason or Will, etc., but—to Imagination." *Dualism, Parallelism and Infinitism* (pp. 212-234): ALFRED H. LLOYD. — The history of thought, it is said, reveals three ages, the age of dualism or medieval christendom, the age of parallelism or that of modern christendom since Bacon and Descartes,

¹ *Op. cit.*, IV., pp. 3-4.